129 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis] |
13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
17925 | Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan] |
17926 | Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
17924 | Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan] |
13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
17929 | Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan] |
17930 | Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan] |
17928 | Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan] |
17923 | Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan] |
17941 | Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
17922 | Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan] |
17936 | Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan] |
17940 | Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan] |
17931 | Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan] |
17932 | If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis] |
5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis] |
13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis] |
5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis] |
13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis] |
13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis] |
13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis] |
5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis] |
5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis] |
5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis] |
5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis] |
17943 | Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan] |
13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
17939 | Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan] |
5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis] |
17938 | Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
17933 | Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan] |
17935 | If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan] |
17942 | Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan] |
17934 | Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan] |
17937 | Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan] |
13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG] |
5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis] |
5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis] |
13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis] |
5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis] |
13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis] |
5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis] |
5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis] |
13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis] |
5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis] |
5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis] |
5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis] |
13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis] |
5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |