30 ideas
7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |