Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, C.I. Lewis and JP Burgess / G Rosen

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31 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]