Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Chris Swoyer and C.I. Lewis

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39 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
14592 Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
14594 Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
14595 Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14593 Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
7803 Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]