51 ideas
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
14611 | Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
17070 | Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart] |
17072 | We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
17073 | I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart] |
17077 | The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart] |
17078 | Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart] |
17061 | Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart] |
17074 | Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart] |
17076 | Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart] |
17071 | An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart] |
17062 | If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart] |
17075 | Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
22405 | Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart] |
22404 | Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart] |
14613 | Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart] |
17063 | Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart] |
14615 | If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart] |
14614 | The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |