Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, David Liggins and John Dupr

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30 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]