419 ideas
| 21875 | The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza] |
| 17230 | If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza] |
| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
| 13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
| 4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
| 4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
| 13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
| 17200 | We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza] |
| 4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
| 17194 | Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
| 4840 | Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza] |
| 17213 | In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza] |
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| 4819 | There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza] |
| 4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
| 16541 | All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza] |
| 16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
| 16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
| 16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
| 16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 21864 | Truth is its own standard [Spinoza] |
| 8018 | Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza] |
| 5641 | For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 4816 | A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 20309 | If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza] |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
| 17185 | Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza] |
| 4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
| 17222 | The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza] |
| 17197 | The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza] |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
| 4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
| 17174 | Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza] |
| 17176 | The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza] |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| 17179 | There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza] |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
| 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
| 15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis] |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
| 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
| 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
| 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
| 17186 | Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza] |
| 20127 | Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza] |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
| 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
| 17170 | An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza] |
| 17171 | A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza] |
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
| 4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
| 4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
| 4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
| 17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
| 17206 | The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza] |
| 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 17192 | The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza] |
| 4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
| 8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
| 4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
| 7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
| 8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
| 4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
| 17188 | A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza] |
| 5639 | Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 21857 | Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 4813 | Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza] |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
| 16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
| 16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
| 4828 | The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza] |
| 16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
| 17187 | Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza] |
| 17191 | Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza] |
| 17184 | All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza] |
| 13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
| 16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
| 4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
| 13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
| 16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
| 4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
| 4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
| 4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
| 17205 | Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| 17175 | There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza] |
| 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
| 17173 | Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza] |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
| 16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
| 17183 | Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
| 16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
| 4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
| 4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
| 4822 | Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza] |
| 17182 | Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza] |
| 16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
| 16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
| 4818 | People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza] |
| 20310 | Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza] |
| 4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
| 17208 | A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza] |
| 17209 | A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza] |
| 5640 | Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 17211 | Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 21801 | Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 17193 | True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza] |
| 21863 | You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza] |
| 17199 | A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza] |
| 5638 | 'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 4831 | If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 4865 | The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza] |
| 20306 | Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza] |
| 16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 4835 | Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza] |
| 20308 | Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
| 8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
| 4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
| 4312 | To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 13073 | To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza] |
| 4833 | The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza] |
| 16198 | Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 17198 | Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza] |
| 17201 | The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza] |
| 17196 | The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 21805 | Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 17204 | Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 17212 | To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 21804 | Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza] |
| 8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
| 4832 | If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza] |
| 21869 | Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza] |
| 20307 | As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza] |
| 21803 | The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 4836 | The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 21861 | Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 17216 | The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 4814 | A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza] |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| 4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
| 21802 | An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza] |
| 4837 | 'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza] |
| 4843 | Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza] |
| 4844 | The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza] |
| 4311 | We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza] |
| 7828 | The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza] |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
| 21860 | Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 4308 | Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
| 4846 | We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 4834 | Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 23951 | Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza] |
| 4849 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza] |
| 23990 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie] |
| 17203 | Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza] |
| 4864 | An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza] |
| 7832 | Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 4863 | An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 4841 | People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 21807 | Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
| 4830 | An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza] |
| 4842 | Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza] |
| 20311 | An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
| 4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
| 4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 4838 | Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza] |
| 4309 | Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 20305 | Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 17202 | We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza] |
| 21865 | We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 21868 | We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza] |
| 4870 | The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope will appear horrible [Spinoza] |
| 4867 | Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 21873 | Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza] |
| 21872 | We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza] |
| 17189 | The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza] |
| 17207 | By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza] |
| 8019 | Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
| 17229 | If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza] |
| 4845 | We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza] |
| 17217 | Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 4848 | Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza] |
| 7833 | Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 17224 | If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza] |
| 21870 | Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza] |
| 4860 | Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza] |
| 4847 | Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza] |
| 4859 | Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza] |
| 4851 | Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza] |
| 17220 | Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza] |
| 4852 | Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza] |
| 17214 | To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza] |
| 21871 | The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza] |
| 17210 | All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza] |
| 4856 | To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza] |
| 17221 | A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza] |
| 17225 | In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza] |
| 17219 | A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza] |
| 4857 | Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza] |
| 17223 | Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza] |
| 17218 | People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza] |
| 17228 | Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza] |
| 4853 | Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza] |
| 4858 | A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza] |
| 4855 | If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza] |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| 21874 | The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza] |
| 8020 | Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| 7412 | Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck] |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| 17227 | Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza] |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| 17226 | The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza] |
| 4854 | It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza] |
| 17215 | Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza] |
| 17190 | We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza] |
| 4826 | Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza] |
| 1587 | Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
| 1588 | For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza] |
| 12731 | Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza] |
| 4821 | An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza] |
| 17177 | In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza] |
| 4850 | A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza] |
| 4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
| 4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
| 4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
| 4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
| 4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
| 4815 | From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza] |
| 4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
| 14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
| 4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
| 4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
| 7835 | The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 17231 | God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza] |
| 17172 | God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza] |
| 4823 | God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza] |
| 12928 | Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 7571 | Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley] |
| 4314 | God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 7609 | God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K] |
| 19435 | God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 21859 | God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza] |
| 4866 | God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza] |
| 7829 | God no more has human perfections than we have animal perfections [Spinoza] |
| 4825 | To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza] |
| 21856 | Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 17178 | Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza] |
| 21858 | God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord] |
| 4820 | God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza] |
| 17169 | Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza] |
| 4817 | If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza] |
| 4868 | Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza] |
| 4827 | Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza] |
| 12757 | That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza] |
| 4829 | The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza] |
| 17181 | God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza] |
| 17180 | Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza] |
| 7830 | A talking triangle would say God is triangular [Spinoza] |
| 7836 | In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
| 7831 | Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
| 21876 | After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza] |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |