97 ideas
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
15570 | Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt] |
7614 | Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam] |
6893 | Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner] |
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
3348 | If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl] |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
21216 | Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |