Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Gareth Evans and G Deleuze / F Guattari

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
8220 Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
8217 Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
8242 Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
8223 The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
8247 Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
8224 'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
8219 Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
8246 Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
16459 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
16460 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
14484 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16224 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
14895 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11881 Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
8221 We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
7639 The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
8222 Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
8218 Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
8248 Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
8245 The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
21906 Political theory should not focus on the state or economy, but on the small scale of power [Deleuze/Guattari, by May]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
8243 Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]