51 ideas
| 4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
| 4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
| 18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle] |
| 4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
| 4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
| 4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
| 4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
| 10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
| 4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
| 4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
| 4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
| 4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
| 4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
| 4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
| 4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
| 4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
| 4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
| 4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
| 4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
| 4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |