69 ideas
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
10073 | There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P] |
10616 | Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P] |
10075 | A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P] |
10074 | A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P] |
10612 | An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P] |
10076 | The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P] |
10605 | Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P] |
10615 | The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P] |
10595 | A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P] |
10602 | A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P] |
10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
10078 | An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P] |
10077 | A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P] |
10079 | A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P] |
10070 | If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P] |
10086 | Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P] |
10596 | A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P] |
10598 | A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P] |
10597 | 'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P] |
10069 | A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P] |
10609 | Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P] |
10080 | 'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P] |
10087 | A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P] |
10088 | Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P] |
10081 | A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P] |
10083 | A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P] |
10084 | A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P] |
10085 | The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P] |
10601 | The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P] |
10600 | Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P] |
10599 | For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P] |
10610 | The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P] |
10619 | The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P] |
10618 | All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P] |
10608 | The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P] |
10849 | Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P] |
10850 | Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P] |
10852 | Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P] |
10851 | Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P] |
10068 | Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P] |
10603 | The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P] |
10848 | Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P] |
10604 | Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P] |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
10617 | The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P] |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |