56 ideas
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |