609 ideas
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
2118 | All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz] |
19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
18832 | Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
19370 | 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
19391 | We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
19390 | Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz] |
15938 | Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett] |
19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
13190 | I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz] |
19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
15939 | For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
5060 | All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz] |
19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
15049 | Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
12723 | The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
12716 | The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz] |
13197 | The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
13432 | The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz] |
13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
13083 | The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz] |
13082 | The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz] |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12694 | Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz] |
11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
12742 | A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz] |
5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
9155 | An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz] |
19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
19392 | I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz] |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
19398 | Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
12729 | The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz] |
13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
13158 | The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz] |
12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
19355 | The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz] |
2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
19376 | A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz] |
19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
19436 | Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
12696 | Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz] |
19348 | All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13097 | Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz] |
16709 | Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz] |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |
7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |
19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |
5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |