Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Michael J. Sandel and Amie L. Thomasson

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55 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel]
Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel]
Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel]
A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten]
Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit]
Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel]
In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel]
Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel]
Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel]
Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel]
Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel]
Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]