410 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |