Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Paul Thagard and Francesco Orsi

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28 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard]
Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard]
Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart]
2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart]
3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart]
4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart]
5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart]
6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]