Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Robert Audi and Michael Devitt

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43 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
2730 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
2715 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
2735 Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
2727 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
2728 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2719 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
2720 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2718 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2729 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
2741 The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2731 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2738 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
2740 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2737 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
2726 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]