25 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |