Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Sren Kierkegaard and Jonathan Schaffer

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102 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
I recognise knowledge, but it is the truth by which I can live and die that really matters [Kierkegaard]
Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard]
Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety is not a passing mood, but a response to human freedom [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
The ultimate in life is learning to be anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Ultimate knowledge is being anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Anxiety is staring into the yawning abyss of freedom [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard]
Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard]
Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
When we seek our own 'freedom' we are just trying to avoid responsibility [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard]
Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]