Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Stephen Mumford and Will Kymlicka

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132 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka]
One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka]
A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka]
Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka]
Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka]
Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka]
Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka]
The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka]
The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka]
We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka]
Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka]
Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka]
We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka]
Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka]
Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka]
Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka]
The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka]
Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka]
'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka]
Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka]
Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka]
Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka]
Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka]
The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka]
Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka]
Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka]
Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka]
Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka]
Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka]
Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka]
Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka]
Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka]
Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]