Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Thomas W. Polger and Penelope Mackie

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25 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6375 The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
6381 The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
6378 Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6380 Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
6379 A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
6377 Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]