65 ideas
| 24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
| 13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
| 14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| 17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
| 17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
| 17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
| 17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
| 13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
| 14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
| 14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
| 13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
| 24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
| 14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
| 13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
| 24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
| 14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
| 13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
| 14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
| 13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
| 13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
| 14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
| 13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
| 13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
| 13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
| 13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |