366 ideas
7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
16395 | Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker] |
21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
17034 | Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke] |
24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
4955 | Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke] |
3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |
16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
10163 | Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman] |
10559 | Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta] |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
10760 | With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg] |
16189 | The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen] |
15132 | The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson] |
10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
10437 | Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4949 | Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
8957 | Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó] |
10428 | Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4959 | A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
21963 | It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes] |
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
14896 | Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross] |
16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
17647 | Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam] |
2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
16995 | Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke] |
17047 | If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke] |
11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
5450 | For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner] |
17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
17055 | Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke] |
16997 | An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke] |
17045 | De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke] |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
17030 | Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke] |
16955 | Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett] |
16996 | Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke] |
13971 | Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames] |
12100 | An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt] |
12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
16991 | No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke] |
11867 | If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins] |
12018 | Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G] |
17046 | Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke] |
8274 | Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
11880 | Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P] |
4797 | Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos] |
17037 | Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke] |
17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
4728 | Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady] |
16990 | A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke] |
9386 | The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
4960 | "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke] |
4966 | Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
2408 | Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers] |
13967 | Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke] |
13970 | Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames] |
3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
16992 | Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
16993 | If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke] |
16998 | Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke] |
17001 | A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke] |
4952 | Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
7761 | Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan] |
7693 | Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette] |
5821 | Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam] |
14068 | If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke] |
10436 | A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4953 | We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke] |
4961 | It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
9807 | In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes] |
2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
8259 | Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe] |
16989 | Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke] |
4947 | A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke] |
24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
13975 | Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames] |
17048 | Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke] |
17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
4948 | Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke] |
24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
3789 | The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes] |
4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
7430 | Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke] |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
7867 | If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau] |
3228 | Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey] |
5832 | Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP] |
4968 | Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
16394 | Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke] |
17874 | Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke] |
5822 | The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke] |
17033 | We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke] |
4689 | Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn] |
17504 | Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam] |
17035 | We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke] |
4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
16988 | Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG] |
17029 | It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke] |
17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
14893 | Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |
20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
17056 | Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke] |
4963 | The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke] |
4964 | 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke] |
17053 | Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke] |
6765 | Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird] |
2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
9387 | The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke] |
17054 | Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke] |
17057 | Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4965 | Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke] |
20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
17050 | Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke] |
17049 | 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke] |
17051 | The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke] |
2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |
2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
16712 | Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes] |
16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |