Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hesiod, Ren Descartes and Saul A. Kripke

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366 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes]
Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes]
Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes]
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One truth leads us to another [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes]
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes]
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen]
The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes]
Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes]
If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes]
In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes]
We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes]
In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes]
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes]
Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes]
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes]
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes]
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes]
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan]
The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]
A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes]
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes]
Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]