18 ideas
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8250 | So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra] |
| 8719 | There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
| 8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 7756 | Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan] |
| 15781 | The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |