24 ideas
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |