Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Homer, B Russell/AN Whitehead and G. Aldo Antonelli

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41 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead]
Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes]
'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman]
The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead]
The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead]
The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Let there be one ruler [Homer]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche]