Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Homer, Douglas Edwards and Jan Westerhoff

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13134 We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13124 Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
13117 How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
13116 Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
13118 Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
13125 Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
13126 Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
13130 Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
13131 The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
13123 All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
13115 Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
13119 Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
13135 A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18430 We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18432 Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
18437 Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
18434 That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
13129 Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
2170 Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
2171 The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21819 Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
11388 Let there be one ruler [Homer]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
14829 Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche]