Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Homer, E Margolis/S Laurence and Jonathan Kvanvig

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
11147 Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
11141 Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
2170 Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
11142 Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
11121 Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
11120 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
11122 A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
11124 Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
11123 Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
11125 The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
11140 Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
11128 Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
11130 Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
11129 The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
11131 It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
11132 The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
11133 Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
11134 People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
11135 Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
11136 Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
11137 The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
11138 The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
11139 Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
11146 People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
2171 The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21819 Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
11388 Let there be one ruler [Homer]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
14829 Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche]