56 ideas
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |