67 ideas
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
8972 | What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
6981 | Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson] |
2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |
21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
7101 | Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman] |
11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |