32 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
7598 | Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets evolved different versions of monotheism [Zoroaster, by Armstrong,K] |
7472 | Zarathustra was the first to present a god who is an abstract concept [Zoroaster] |
20672 | Zoroastrianism saw the world as a battle between good evil gods [Zoroaster, by Harari] |