92 ideas
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
| 20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
| 23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
| 23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
| 19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
| 20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
| 20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
| 23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
| 23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
| 23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
| 23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
| 23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
| 23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
| 20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
| 20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
| 20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
| 23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
| 20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
| 20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
| 20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
| 20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
| 20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
| 20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
| 20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
| 20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
| 20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
| 23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
| 23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
| 23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
| 20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
| 23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
| 20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
| 20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
| 23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
| 23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
| 20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
| 20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
| 20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
| 23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
| 23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
| 20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
| 20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
| 23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
| 23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
| 23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
| 23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
| 23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
| 23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
| 23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
| 23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
| 23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
| 23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
| 23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
| 23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
| 23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
| 23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
| 20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
| 23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
| 23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
| 23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |