68 ideas
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
| 18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
| 18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
| 18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
| 18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
| 18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
| 18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
| 18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
| 18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
| 18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
| 18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
| 18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 7404 | Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| 20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
| 20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
| 20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
| 7402 | Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| 20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
| 20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
| 20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
| 20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
| 20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
| 20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
| 20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
| 20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
| 20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
| 20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
| 21938 | Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius] |
| 20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
| 20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
| 20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
| 20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
| 20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
| 20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
| 20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
| 20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
| 20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 19845 | A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau] |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| 20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
| 20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
| 20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
| 20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
| 20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
| 20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
| 22133 | Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD] |
| 7406 | A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| 7403 | Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck] |
| 20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
| 23585 | It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |
| 6892 | Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner] |