50 ideas
18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
7404 | Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck] |
5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
7402 | Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck] |
21938 | Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius] |
19845 | A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau] |
5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
22133 | Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD] |
7406 | A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck] |
7403 | Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck] |
23585 | It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius] |
5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |
6892 | Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner] |