557 ideas
5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
6200 | Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant] |
21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
6207 | What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant] |
5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
6184 | Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant] |
21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
6203 | Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant] |
21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
9724 | Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton] |
9703 | 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton] |
9705 | 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton] |
9704 | 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton] |
9710 | We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton] |
9707 | 'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton] |
13206 | A 'linear or total ordering' must be transitive and satisfy trichotomy [Enderton] |
13201 | ∈ says the whole set is in the other; ⊆ says the members of the subset are in the other [Enderton] |
13204 | The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}} [Enderton] |
9699 | The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton] |
9700 | Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton] |
9702 | A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton] |
9701 | A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton] |
9706 | A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton] |
9708 | A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton] |
9709 | A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton] |
9711 | A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton] |
9712 | A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton] |
9717 | A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton] |
9713 | A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton] |
9714 | A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton] |
13200 | Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ [Enderton] |
13199 | The empty set may look pointless, but many sets can be constructed from it [Enderton] |
13203 | The singleton is defined using the pairing axiom (as {x,x}) [Enderton] |
9715 | An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton] |
9716 | We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton] |
13202 | Fraenkel added Replacement, to give a theory of ordinal numbers [Enderton] |
13205 | We can only define functions if Choice tells us which items are involved [Enderton] |
18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
9722 | Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton] |
22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
9718 | Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton] |
5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
9721 | A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton] |
9994 | A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton] |
9719 | A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton] |
9720 | A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton] |
9995 | Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton] |
9996 | Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton] |
9997 | For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton] |
21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
9723 | Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton] |
6181 | Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant] |
18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
21971 | Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant] |
9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
15308 | Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
6183 | Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant] |
6191 | The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant] |
21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
6190 | The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant] |
12157 | Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton] |
20346 | The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim] |
18547 | Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton] |
24172 | It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant] |
20408 | With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant] |
20409 | When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant] |
20411 | Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant] |
24170 | Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant] |
22711 | The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch] |
4025 | Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C] |
20412 | Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant] |
22046 | The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21458 | The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner] |
5643 | Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton] |
20410 | The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant] |
5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
18235 | Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
18675 | Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant] |
22007 | An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard] |
18234 | The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
6192 | Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant] |
18239 | What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
18238 | Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant] |
21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
6197 | Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant] |
6193 | Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant] |
1452 | Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant] |
1454 | Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant] |
21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
22442 | If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant] |
3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
6194 | The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant] |
6198 | Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant] |
21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
1456 | Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant] |
21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
22441 | The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant] |
6187 | Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant] |
8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
6185 | No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant] |
3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
6201 | Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant] |
3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
6186 | A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant] |
6195 | Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant] |
21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
21075 | The state of nature always involves the threat of war [Kant] |
3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
20569 | Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Kant, by Oksala] |
21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
21079 | The a priori general will of a people shows what is right [Kant] |
21077 | Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution [Kant] |
21078 | A constitution must always be improved when necessary [Kant] |
21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
21058 | Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant] |
7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
21076 | Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure [Kant] |
21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
20570 | There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere [Kant] |
20571 | There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights [Kant] |
21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
21073 | Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights [Kant] |
21074 | Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible [Kant] |
21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
19739 | The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory [Kant] |
6188 | A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant] |
3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
22053 | The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Kant, by Bowie] |
5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
18237 | Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose [Kant] |
5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
19068 | Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford] |
14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |
16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
6199 | Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant] |
5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
1453 | We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant] |
1455 | Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG] |
5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |
6205 | To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant] |
6204 | Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant] |
6206 | From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant] |
6202 | In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant] |