935 ideas
| 12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
| 19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
| 19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
| 5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
| 6200 | Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant] |
| 21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
| 12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
| 19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
| 2118 | All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz] |
| 19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
| 6207 | What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant] |
| 6184 | Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant] |
| 5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
| 21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
| 5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
| 13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
| 21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
| 7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
| 21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
| 16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
| 5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
| 21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
| 21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
| 16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| 12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
| 9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
| 6203 | Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant] |
| 21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
| 12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
| 5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
| 13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
| 18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
| 9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
| 5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
| 16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
| 13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
| 5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
| 5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
| 5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
| 21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
| 19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
| 5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
| 5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
| 5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
| 5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
| 21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
| 18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| 21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
| 5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
| 12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
| 19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
| 19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
| 5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
| 3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4642 | No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz] |
| 5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
| 5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
| 2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
| 2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
| 3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
| 19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
| 5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
| 12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
| 12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
| 5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
| 22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
| 5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
| 23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
| 5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
| 8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
| 19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
| 19389 | Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 19388 | True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz] |
| 5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
| 13157 | Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz] |
| 18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge] |
| 5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| 2115 | Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz] |
| 5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
| 18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
| 12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 19370 | 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
| 2111 | Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz] |
| 12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
| 19391 | We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz] |
| 21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
| 16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
| 13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
| 13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
| 8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
| 16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
| 8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
| 16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
| 16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
| 12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
| 9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
| 12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
| 16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
| 19390 | Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz] |
| 9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
| 19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
| 13190 | I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz] |
| 19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
| 12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
| 3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
| 8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
| 12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
| 16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
| 16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
| 17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
| 16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
| 12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
| 2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
| 12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
| 12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
| 19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
| 19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
| 5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
| 19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
| 12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
| 19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
| 7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
| 12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
| 12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
| 5060 | All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz] |
| 19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
| 19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
| 12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
| 12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
| 12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
| 7644 | The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz] |
| 11857 | He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
| 7843 | Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz] |
| 12751 | It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz] |
| 19363 | Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz] |
| 19352 | A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz] |
| 12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
| 12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
| 12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
| 13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
| 13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
| 7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
| 12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
| 19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
| 21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
| 18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge] |
| 13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
| 21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
| 5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
| 6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
| 12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
| 12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
| 13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
| 19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
| 21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
| 12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
| 12735 | Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning [Leibniz] |
| 12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
| 12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
| 12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
| 13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
| 12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
| 13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
| 12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
| 12723 | The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz] |
| 12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
| 12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
| 12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
| 13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
| 12714 | The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz] |
| 12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
| 12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
| 12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
| 12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
| 12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
| 19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
| 5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
| 21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
| 12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
| 12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
| 12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
| 12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
| 19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
| 13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
| 12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
| 12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
| 16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
| 12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
| 12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
| 12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
| 12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
| 13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
| 12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
| 19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
| 5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
| 12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
| 12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
| 12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
| 12716 | The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz] |
| 13197 | The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz] |
| 12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
| 12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
| 7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
| 13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
| 13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
| 21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
| 5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
| 12712 | Substance is that which can act [Leibniz] |
| 7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 7931 | If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C] |
| 11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
| 16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
| 12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
| 12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
| 13432 | The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz] |
| 13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
| 13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
| 12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
| 12743 | A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz] |
| 12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
| 12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
| 12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
| 12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
| 13083 | The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz] |
| 13082 | The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz] |
| 13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
| 5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
| 13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
| 11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
| 12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
| 12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
| 12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
| 12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
| 12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
| 12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
| 12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12694 | Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz] |
| 11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
| 13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
| 5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
| 12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
| 19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
| 16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
| 5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
| 13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
| 19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
| 19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
| 17554 | There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz] |
| 7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
| 8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
| 18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
| 13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
| 12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
| 12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
| 15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
| 15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
| 12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
| 12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
| 12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
| 12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
| 5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
| 5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
| 12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
| 13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
| 5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
| 5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
| 21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
| 18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
| 12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
| 5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
| 4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
| 6181 | Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant] |
| 12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
| 12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
| 12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| 19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
| 13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
| 12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
| 15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
| 18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
| 7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| 19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
| 12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
| 11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
| 13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
| 20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
| 5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
| 19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
| 15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
| 5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
| 12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
| 16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
| 5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
| 13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
| 12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
| 19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
| 12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
| 13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
| 5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
| 12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
| 5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
| 12742 | A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz] |
| 5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
| 21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
| 6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
| 6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
| 21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
| 5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
| 5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
| 21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
| 21971 | Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant] |
| 9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
| 7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
| 9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
| 21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
| 9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
| 12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
| 12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
| 12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
| 21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
| 12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
| 9344 | Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
| 9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
| 16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
| 9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
| 9155 | An a priori proof is independent of experience [Leibniz] |
| 3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| 20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
| 5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
| 16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
| 5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
| 5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
| 5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
| 5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
| 5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
| 5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
| 5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
| 5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
| 18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
| 16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
| 5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
| 16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
| 5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
| 19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
| 19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
| 19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
| 21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
| 5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
| 12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
| 19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
| 16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
| 12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
| 16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
| 2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| 12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
| 4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
| 12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
| 5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
| 2110 | We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz] |
| 19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
| 22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
| 6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
| 5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
| 13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
| 5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
| 5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
| 8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
| 5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
| 5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
| 7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
| 19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
| 12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
| 19392 | I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz] |
| 5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
| 5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
| 6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
| 12738 | Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature [Leibniz] |
| 5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
| 19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
| 5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
| 12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 19398 | Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes [Leibniz] |
| 12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
| 13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
| 15308 | Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant] |
| 13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
| 12729 | The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz] |
| 13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
| 13158 | The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
| 5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
| 5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
| 19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
| 4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
| 12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 19355 | The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz] |
| 2109 | Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz] |
| 2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
| 5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
| 22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
| 12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
| 13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
| 19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
| 13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
| 21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
| 5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| 5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
| 19362 | We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz] |
| 5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
| 5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
| 5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
| 12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
| 5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
| 2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
| 5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| 5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
| 5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| 21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
| 9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| 19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
| 19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
| 7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
| 13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
| 5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
| 5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
| 12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
| 5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
| 7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| 2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
| 19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
| 19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
| 12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
| 5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
| 5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
| 5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| 19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
| 8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
| 21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
| 19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
| 5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
| 5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
| 19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
| 12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
| 12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
| 19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
| 17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
| 5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
| 5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
| 22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
| 19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
| 13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
| 7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
| 16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
| 16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
| 20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
| 20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
| 8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
| 12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
| 19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
| 6183 | Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant] |
| 6191 | The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant] |
| 19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
| 21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
| 6190 | The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant] |
| 12157 | Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton] |
| 20346 | The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim] |
| 18547 | Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton] |
| 20408 | With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant] |
| 12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
| 20409 | When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant] |
| 20411 | Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant] |
| 22711 | The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch] |
| 4025 | Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C] |
| 20412 | Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant] |
| 8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
| 12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
| 22046 | The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21458 | The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 5643 | Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton] |
| 20410 | The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant] |
| 5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
| 5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
| 21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
| 7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 18235 | Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| 21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
| 6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| 5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 18675 | Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant] |
| 22007 | An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 18234 | The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6192 | Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant] |
| 18239 | What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 18238 | Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant] |
| 21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
| 21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |
| 19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
| 19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| 12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
| 21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
| 19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
| 12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| 19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
| 6197 | Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant] |
| 12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
| 6193 | Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant] |
| 1452 | Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant] |
| 1454 | Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
| 5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
| 12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| 22442 | If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant] |
| 6194 | The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant] |
| 6198 | Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant] |
| 21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
| 21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
| 21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| 1456 | Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant] |
| 21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
| 21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
| 21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
| 21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
| 21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| 21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
| 21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
| 21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
| 21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
| 21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
| 21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| 19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 22441 | The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant] |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| 21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 6185 | No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant] |
| 6187 | Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant] |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| 6201 | Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant] |
| 5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
| 5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| 6186 | A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant] |
| 6195 | Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant] |
| 21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| 6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
| 21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
| 21075 | The state of nature always involves the threat of war [Kant] |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| 21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
| 21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
| 21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
| 21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
| 21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
| 20569 | Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Kant, by Oksala] |
| 21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
| 21079 | The a priori general will of a people shows what is right [Kant] |
| 21077 | Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution [Kant] |
| 21078 | A constitution must always be improved when necessary [Kant] |
| 21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
| 21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
| 21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
| 21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
| 5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
| 21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
| 21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
| 21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
| 21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
| 21058 | Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant] |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
| 21076 | Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure [Kant] |
| 21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
| 21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
| 20570 | There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere [Kant] |
| 20571 | There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights [Kant] |
| 21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
| 21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
| 21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
| 21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
| 21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
| 7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| 21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
| 12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
| 21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
| 21073 | Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights [Kant] |
| 21074 | Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible [Kant] |
| 21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
| 6188 | A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant] |
| 19739 | The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory [Kant] |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| 21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
| 21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
| 19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
| 22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
| 8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
| 22053 | The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 19376 | A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts [Leibniz] |
| 5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
| 18237 | Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose [Kant] |
| 19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
| 19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
| 12707 | The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz] |
| 2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
| 15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
| 19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| 2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
| 7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
| 19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
| 19436 | Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz] |
| 16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| 13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
| 5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| 5059 | Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz] |
| 14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
| 5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
| 9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
| 5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
| 2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
| 12702 | Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz] |
| 5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
| 12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| 13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
| 11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
| 12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
| 11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
| 19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
| 19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |
| 12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
| 11945 | In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz] |
| 13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
| 13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
| 7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 12696 | Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz] |
| 19348 | All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz] |
| 12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
| 13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
| 12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
| 15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
| 12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |
| 12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
| 13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
| 13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
| 13097 | Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz] |
| 16709 | Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz] |
| 20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |
| 13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
| 16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
| 17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
| 5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
| 2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
| 12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
| 16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
| 5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
| 13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
| 19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |
| 5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
| 12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
| 2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
| 12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |
| 5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
| 5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
| 2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
| 5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
| 22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |
| 19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |
| 12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
| 19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
| 5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
| 1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
| 19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 2114 | This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz] |
| 12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| 21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
| 22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
| 19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| 19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| 6199 | Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant] |
| 5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
| 19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
| 5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
| 19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
| 3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
| 2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
| 2113 | God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz] |
| 8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
| 3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
| 5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
| 5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
| 5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
| 5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
| 1453 | We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant] |
| 1455 | Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG] |
| 19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
| 5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |
| 6205 | To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant] |
| 2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |
| 2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
| 19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |
| 19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
| 6204 | Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant] |
| 6206 | From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant] |
| 12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
| 12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
| 5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
| 19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |
| 6202 | In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant] |
| 7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
| 19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
| 12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
| 12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
| 5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |
| 12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
| 13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
| 19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
| 19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |