Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irenaeus, Democritus and Charles Sanders Peirce

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172 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus]
Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle]
We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus]
We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus]
It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus]
We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero]
Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius]
The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry]
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero]
Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle]
'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg]
Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus]
If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus]
Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle]
There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle]
The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen]
If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus]
Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus]
Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B]