45 ideas
8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
8917 | The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen] |
8912 | Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen] |
8913 | Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen] |
8914 | Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen] |
8916 | Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen] |
8918 | Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen] |
8919 | Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |
8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |
20698 | Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B] |