Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irenaeus, Gideon Rosen and Michael Walzer

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58 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B]