115 ideas
| 16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
| 7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
| 16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
| 16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
| 16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
| 16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
| 16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
| 16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
| 16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
| 16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
| 16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
| 16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
| 16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
| 16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
| 16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
| 16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
| 16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
| 16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
| 16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
| 16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
| 16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| 16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
| 16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
| 16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
| 16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
| 16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
| 16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
| 16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
| 16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
| 16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
| 16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
| 16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
| 22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
| 16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
| 7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
| 7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
| 7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
| 20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
| 7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
| 7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
| 7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
| 24016 | Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre] |
| 6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
| 22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
| 3847 | Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre] |
| 7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
| 7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
| 7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
| 7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
| 22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
| 7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
| 7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
| 7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
| 7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
| 7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
| 7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
| 3846 | Man IS freedom [Sartre] |
| 24013 | An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre] |
| 24017 | Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre] |
| 24014 | Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre] |
| 24015 | Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre] |
| 6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| 16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
| 7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
| 3843 | There is no human nature [Sartre] |
| 6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
| 20762 | There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre] |
| 3852 | If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre] |
| 22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
| 20764 | In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre] |
| 3848 | Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre] |
| 20763 | When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre] |
| 22229 | Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre] |
| 20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
| 3842 | Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre] |
| 6868 | 'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin] |
| 3844 | Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre] |
| 20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
| 22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
| 20754 | It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre] |
| 22230 | Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 22232 | Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre] |
| 3851 | If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre] |
| 6571 | When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin] |
| 20491 | States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J] |
| 21240 | The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell] |
| 3845 | Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre] |
| 20698 | Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B] |