Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irenaeus, Wilson,G/Schpall,S and George Boole

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8083 Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin]
7727 Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
8686 Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
22277 Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
20698 Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B]