Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Iris Marion Young, J.L. Austin and Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E.

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
As a young girl assumes her status as feminine, she acts in a more fragile immobile way [Young,IM]