29 ideas
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |