Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irving M. Copi, Philippa Foot and Arthur Schopenhauer

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188 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer]
Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer]
The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer]
We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer]
Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer]
Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer]
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer]
Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer]
As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer]
The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner]
Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer]
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer]
Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer]
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer]
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer]
Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer]
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer]
Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot]
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer]
Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer]