135 ideas
| 17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
| 11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
| 16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
| 11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
| 18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
| 13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
| 17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
| 17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
| 13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
| 18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
| 17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
| 14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
| 16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
| 16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
| 16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
| 12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
| 17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
| 12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
| 16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
| 16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
| 11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
| 11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
| 16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
| 11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
| 12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
| 16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
| 16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
| 12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
| 12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
| 12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
| 12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
| 12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
| 12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
| 11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
| 10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
| 14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
| 11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
| 17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
| 12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
| 11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
| 12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
| 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
| 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
| 11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
| 16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
| 11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
| 11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
| 16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
| 11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
| 16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
| 11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
| 16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
| 16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
| 11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
| 16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
| 11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
| 11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
| 16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
| 16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
| 16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
| 11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
| 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
| 16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
| 16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
| 11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
| 11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
| 16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
| 17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
| 17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
| 19155 | Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson] |
| 17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
| 17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
| 17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
| 12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
| 12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
| 11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
| 12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
| 11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
| 16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
| 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
| 16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
| 6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
| 13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
| 17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
| 11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
| 23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
| 15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
| 16746 | Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton] |
| 8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
| 17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
| 17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
| 17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
| 17009 | I won't object if someone shows that gravity consistently arises from the action of matter [Newton] |
| 13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
| 12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
| 15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
| 15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
| 17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
| 17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
| 17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
| 20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
| 20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
| 13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
| 12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
| 13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
| 20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
| 22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
| 22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
| 17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
| 14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
| 22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
| 17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
| 17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
| 17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |