192 ideas
| 17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle] |
| 3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
| 10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
| 13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
| 13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
| 18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
| 17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
| 3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
| 3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
| 3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
| 3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
| 17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
| 17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
| 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
| 3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
| 17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
| 17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
| 17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
| 17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
| 3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
| 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
| 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
| 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
| 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
| 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
| 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
| 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
| 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
| 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
| 3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
| 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
| 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
| 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
| 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
| 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
| 3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
| 3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
| 3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
| 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
| 9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
| 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
| 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
| 6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
| 13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
| 17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
| 23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
| 15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
| 16746 | Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton] |
| 8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
| 17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
| 17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
| 17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
| 17009 | I won't object if someone shows that gravity consistently arises from the action of matter [Newton] |
| 13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
| 12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
| 15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
| 15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
| 17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
| 17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
| 17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
| 20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
| 20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
| 13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
| 12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
| 13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
| 20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
| 22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
| 22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
| 17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
| 14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
| 22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
| 17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
| 3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
| 17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
| 3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
| 17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |