196 ideas
| 18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
| 17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
| 18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
| 18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
| 18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
| 18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
| 18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
| 13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
| 13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
| 18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
| 18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
| 17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
| 18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
| 4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
| 18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
| 18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 21339 | We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil] |
| 21349 | Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil] |
| 21340 | Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil] |
| 18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
| 21348 | In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil] |
| 21351 | Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil] |
| 21344 | If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil] |
| 18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
| 18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
| 4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
| 4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
| 18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
| 4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
| 18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
| 4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
| 4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
| 18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
| 17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 21350 | If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil] |
| 18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
| 18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
| 17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
| 18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
| 18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
| 17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
| 18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
| 18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
| 4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
| 18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
| 4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
| 18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
| 4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
| 17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
| 17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
| 17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
| 4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
| 4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
| 4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
| 4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
| 4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
| 18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
| 4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
| 4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
| 4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
| 4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
| 4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
| 4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
| 4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
| 4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
| 4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
| 4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
| 18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
| 4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
| 18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
| 18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
| 4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
| 18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
| 4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
| 18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
| 6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
| 13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
| 17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
| 23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
| 18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
| 18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
| 15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
| 16746 | Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton] |
| 8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
| 17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
| 17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
| 17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
| 17009 | I won't object if someone shows that gravity consistently arises from the action of matter [Newton] |
| 13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
| 12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
| 15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
| 15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
| 17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
| 17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
| 17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
| 20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
| 20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
| 13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
| 12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
| 13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
| 20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
| 18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
| 17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
| 22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
| 22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
| 17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
| 14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
| 22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
| 17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
| 18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |
| 17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
| 17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |