Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Isaac Newton, Keith Hossack and Gideon Rosen

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108 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton]
Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz]
We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton]
I won't object if someone shows that gravity consistently arises from the action of matter [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P]
1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton]
3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton]
2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton]
Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton]
Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton]
I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton]
The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin]
Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon]
Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton]
Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton]