102 ideas
17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
13152 | We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton] |
13151 | Not all infinites are equal [Newton] |
18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
15863 | The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton] |
16746 | Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton] |
8340 | I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton] |
17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
17009 | I won't object if someone shows that gravity consistently arises from the action of matter [Newton] |
13150 | The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton] |
12178 | That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton] |
15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |