Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J��rgen Habermas, Sidney Morgenbesser and Jonathan Kvanvig

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Moral right is linked to validity and truth, so morality is a matter of knowledge, not an expression of values [Habermas, by Finlayson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
Move from individual willing of a general law, to willing norms agreed with other people [Habermas]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
If everyone is treated with equal injustice, at least that is fair [Morgenbesser]